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Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between the theory of the firm and the theory of
financial markets. I begin with Mises’s claim that the defining feature of an industrialized,
market economy is the use of financial markets to allocate capital among firms and among
industries. This presupposes a market for the ownership and control of productive assets. Unfor-
tunately, the Austrian theory of capital markets is relatively undeveloped. Focusing on the
financial-market entrepreneur, I outline some features of an Austrian theory of corporate gover-
nance and relate them to the internal organization of the firm. I begin by reviewing the tradi-
tional, production-function theory of the firm and suggesting two alternative perspectives: that of
the entrepreneur and that of the capitalist. I next discuss the Coasian or "contractual" approach to
the firm and argue that it provides a useful organizing framework for Austrian research on the
firm. The subsequent section proposes entrepreneurship and economic calculation as building
blocks for an Austrian theory of the firm. Finally, after a brief review of capital-market behavior
and the disciplinary role of takeovers, I outline four areas for Austrian research in corporate
governance: firms as investments, internal capital markets, comparative corporate governance,
and financiers as entrepreneurs.
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1Entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance
In his "closing salvo" in the socialist calculation debate, Mises (1949, pp. 705%10) argued
that the market socialists failed to understand the role of financial markets in an industrial econ-
omy. Even with markets for consumer goods, he explained, socialism would fail because it
substituted collective ownership of the means of production for private capital markets. Through
these markets, owners of financial capital decide which firms, and which industries, receive
resources to make consumer goods. In a modern economy, most production takes place in pub-
licly held corporations. Of prime importance, then, is the problem of corporate governance: How
do owners of financial capital structure their agreements with those who receive that capital, to
prevent its misuse? Unfortunately, there exists little research in this area from an Austrian per-
spective.
In this paper I focus on the financial-market entrepreneur&what Rothbard (1962, 1985) calls
the capitalist%entrepreneur&to outline some features of an Austrian theory of corporate gover-
nance. I begin by reviewing the traditional, production-function theory of the firm and suggesting
two alternative perspectives: that of the entrepreneur and that of the capitalist. I next discuss the
Coasian, or "contractual" approach to the firm and argue that it provides a useful organizing
framework for Austrian research on the firm. The subsequent section proposes entrepreneurship
and economic calculation as building blocks for an Austrian theory of the firm. Finally, after a
brief review of capital-market behavior and the disciplinary role of takeovers, I outline four areas
for Austrian research in corporate governance: firms as investments, internal capital markets,
comparative corporate governance, and financiers as entrepreneurs.
1. The traditional theory of the firm
In economics textbooks, the "firm" is a production function or production possibilities set, a
"black box" that transforms inputs into outputs. Given the existing state of technology, the prices
of inputs, and a demand schedule, the firm maximizes money profits subject to the constraint that
its production plans must be technologically feasible. The firm is modeled as a single actor,
facing a series of uncomplicated decisions: what level of output to produce, how much of each
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factor to hire, and the like. These "decisions," of course, are not really decisions at all; they are
trivial mathematical calculations, implicit in the underlying data. In the long run, the firm may
choose an optimal size and output mix, but even these are determined by the characteristics of
the production function (economies of scale, scope, and sequence). In short: the firm is a set of
cost curves, and the "theory of the firm" is a calculus problem.
While descriptively vacuous, the production-function approach has the appeal of analytical
tractability along with its elegant parallel to neoclassical consumer theory (profit maximization is
like utility maximization, isoquants are indifference curves, and so on). Nonetheless, many
economists now see it as increasingly unsatisfactory, as unable to account for a variety of real-
world business practices: vertical and lateral integration, mergers, geographic and product-line
diversification, franchising, long-term commercial contracting, transfer pricing, research joint
ventures, and many others. The inadequacy of the traditional theory of the firm explains much of
the recent interest in agency theory, transaction cost economics, the capabilities approach, and
other facets of the "new institutional economics."1
A more serious problem with the traditional theory, however, has received less attention. The
theory of profit maximization is nearly always told from the perspective of the manager, the
agent who operates the plant, not that of the owner, who supplies the capital to fund the plant.
Yet owners control how much authority to delegate to operational managers, so capitalists are the
ultimate decision makers. To understand the firm, then, we must focus on the actions and plans
of the suppliers of financial capital.
Focusing on capital markets and the corporate governance problem highlights a fundamental
analytical problem with the traditional approach to the theory of the firm. In the production-
function approach, money capital is treated as a factor of production. The manager’s objective is
to maximize the difference between total revenues and total costs, with the cost of capital treated
simply as another cost (and typically assumed to be exogenous). The residual, "profit," is re-
tained by the manager. Hence financial capital receives scant attention. As discussed below, this
can be a serious flaw.
32. Two alternative perspectives
What, then, is the proper way to understand the business firm? Two alternative perspectives
deserve consideration. The first perspective, which has received substantial attention in the
Austrian literature, is that of the entrepreneur, or what Mises (1949, pp. 254%55) calls the
"entrepreneur%promoter." Entrepreneurship, in the Misesian sense, is the act of bearing uncer-
tainty. Production unfolds through time, and thus the entrepreneur must purchase factors of
production in the present (paying today’s prices, which are known), in anticipation of revenues
from the future sale of the product (at tomorrow’s prices, which are uncertain). Entrepreneurial
profit or loss is the difference between these revenues and the initial outlays, less the general rate
of interest. As such, profit is the reward for successfully bearing uncertainty. Successful promot-
ers make accurate forecasts of future prices and receive returns greater than their outlays. Those
whose forecasts are less accurate earn losses. Promoters who systematically make poor forecasts
quickly find themselves unable to secure any further resources for investment and eventually exit
the market.
The second perspective is that of the capitalist, the owner of the firm. Ownership can also be
thought of as a factor of production&what Rothbard (1962, pp. 538%41) calls the "decision-
making factor"&but it is different from the other factors. In an ownership approach, money
capital is treated as a unique factor of production, the "controlling factor"; the investor is both
ultimate decision maker and residual claimant. The firm’s objective is to maximize the return on
the owner’s investment. Because the owner delegates certain functions to managers, a central
focus of the theory of the firm becomes the problem of corporate governance: How do suppliers
of capital structure their arrangements with managers in a way that maximizes their returns?
This paper argues that the most interesting problems in the theory of the firm relate to the
intersection between the entrepreneurial function and the capitalist function. Indeed, as Mises
argued, the driving force behind the market economy is a particular type of entrepreneur, the
capitalist%entrepreneur, who risks his money capital in anticipation of future, uncertain, returns.
Moreover, as discussed below, the entrepreneur is nearly always also a capitalist, and the capital-
ist is also an entrepreneur. 
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Economists now increasingly recognize the importance of the capitalist in the direction of the
firm’s affairs. In the introduction to his influential book Strong Managers, Weak Owners, Mark
Roe (1994, p. vii) makes the point succinctly:
Economic theory once treated the firm as a collection of machinery, technology,
inventory, workers, and capital. Dump these inputs into a black box, stir them up,
and one got outputs of products and profits. Today, theory sees the firm as more,
as a management structure. The firm succeeds if managers can successfully coor-
dinate the firm’s activities; it fails if managers cannot effectively coordinate and
match people and inputs to current technologies and markets. At the very top of
the firm are the relationships among the firm’s shareholders, its directors, and its
senior managers. If those relationships are dysfunctional, the firm is more likely
to stumble.
As Roe suggests, the relationships between the firm’s owners (shareholders) and its top managers
are centrally important in determining firm performance.2
3. The contractual approach
Both the entrepreneurial perspective and the ownership perspective can be understood from
within the "contractual" framework associated with Coase (1937). Coase was the first to explain
that the boundaries of the organization depend not only on the productive technology, but on the
costs of transacting business. In the Coasian framework, as developed and expanded by William-
son (1975, 1985, 1996), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1990), and others, the decision to organize transactions within the firm as opposed to
on the open market&the "make or buy decision"&depends on the relative costs of internal versus
external exchange. The market mechanism entails certain costs: discovering the relevant prices,
negotiating and enforcing contracts, and so on. Within the firm, the entrepreneur may be able to
reduce these "transaction costs" by coordinating these activities himself. However, internal
organization brings other kinds of transaction costs, namely problems of information flow, incen-
tives, monitoring, and performance evaluation. The boundary of the firm, then, is determined by
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the tradeoff, at the margin, between the relative transaction costs of external and internal ex-
change. In this sense, firm boundaries depend not only on technology, but on organizational
considerations; that is, on the costs and benefits of various contracting alternatives.
Economic organization, both internal and external, imposes costs because complex contracts
are usually incomplete. The transaction-cost literature makes much of the distinction between
complete and incomplete contracts. A complete contract specifies a course of action, a decision,
or terms of trade contingent on every possible future state of affairs. In textbook models of
competitive general equilibrium, all contracts are assumed to be complete. The future is not
known with certainty, but the probability distributions of all possible future events are known.3 In
an important sense, the model is "timeless": all relevant future contingencies are considered in
the ex ante contracting stage, so there are no decisions to be made as the future unfolds.
The Coasian approach relaxes this assumption and holds that complete, contingent contracts
are not always feasible. In a world of "true" (structural, rather than parametric) uncertainty, the
future holds genuine surprises (Foss, 1993a), and this limits the available contracting options. In
simple transactions&for instance, procurement of an off-the-shelf component&uncertainty may
be relatively unimportant, and spot-market contracting works well. For more complex transac-
tions, such as the purchase and installation of specialized equipment, the underlying agreements
will typically be incomplete&the contract will provide remedies for only some possible future
contingencies.4 One example is a relational contract, an agreement that describes shared goals
and a set of general principles that govern the relationship (Goldberg, 1980). Another is an
implicit contract&an agreement that while unstated, is presumably understood by all sides.5
Regardless, contractual incompleteness exposes the contracting parties to certain risks. In partic-
ular, investment in relationship-specific assets exposes agents to a potential "holdup" problem: If
6circumstances change, their trading partners may try to expropriate the rents accruing to the
specific assets. Suppose an upstream supplier tailors its equipment to service a particular cus-
tomer. After the equipment is in place, the customer may demand a lower price, knowing that the
salvage value of the specialized equipment is lower than the net payment it offers. Anticipating
this possibility, the supplier will be unwilling to install the custom machinery without protection
for such a contingency, even if the specialized technology would make the relationship more
profitable for both sides.
One way to safeguard rents accruing to specific assets is vertical (or lateral) integration,
where a merger eliminates any adversarial interests. Less extreme options include long-term
contracts (Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990), partial ownership agreements (Pisano, Russo, and
Teece, 1988; Pisano, 1990), or agreements for both parties to invest in offsetting relationship-
specific investments (Heide and John, 1988). Overall, parties may employ several governance
structures. The Coasian literature tries to match the appropriate governance structure with the
particular characteristics of the transaction.
There is some debate within the Austrian literature about whether the basic Coasian approach
is compatible with Austrian economics. O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, p. 124) while acknowledg-
ing Coase’s approach as an "excellent static conceptualization of the problem," argue that a more
evolutionary framework is needed to understand how firms respond to change. Some Austrian
economists have suggested that the Coasian framework may be too narrow, too squarely in the
general-equilibrium tradition to deal adequately with Austrian concerns (Boudreaux and
Holcombe, 1989; Langlois, 1994). However, as Foss (1993b) has pointed out, there are "two
Coasian traditions." One tradition, the moral-hazard or agency-theoretic branch associated with
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), studies the design of ex-ante mechanisms to limit shirking when
supervision is costly. Here the emphasis is on monitoring and incentives in an (exogenously
determined) agency relationship. The above criticisms may apply to this branch of the modern
literature, but they do not apply to the other tradition, the governance or asset-specificity branch,
especially in Williamson’s more heterodox formulation. Williamson’s transaction cost frame-
work incorporates non-maximizing behavior (bounded rationality); true, "structural" uncertainty
or genuine surprise (complete contracts are held not to be feasible, meaning that all ex-post
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contingencies cannot be contracted upon ex ante); and process or adaptation over time (trading
relationships develop over time, typically undergoing a "fundamental transformation" that
changes the terms of trade). In short, "at least some modern theories of the firm do not at all
presuppose the ‘closed’ economic universe&with all relevant inputs and outputs being given,
human action conceptualized as maximization, etc.&that [some critics] claim are underneath the
contemporary theory of the firm" (Foss, 1993a, p. 274). Stated differently, one can adopt an
essentially Coasian perspective without abandoning the Knightian or Austrian view of the
entrepreneur as an uncertainty-bearing, innovating decision maker.6
4. Building blocks of an Austrian theory of the firm
Beginning with the basic Coasian or contractual framework, we can add two elements as
building blocks to an Austrian theory of the firm: entrepreneurship and economic calculation.
Entrepreneurship represents the bearing of uncertainty. Economic calculation is the tool entrepre-
neurs use to assess costs and expected future benefits. Consider each in turn.
4.1. Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship, in the Misesian sense, is the act of bearing uncertainty. In an ever-changing
world, decisions must be made based on expectations of future events. Because production takes
time, resources must be invested before the returns on those investments are realized. If the
forecast of future returns is inaccurate, the expected profits will turn out to be losses. This is of
course true not only of financial investors, but all human actors. If the future were known with
certainty, man would not act, since his action would not change the future. Thus all purposeful
human action carries some risk that the means chosen will not bring about the desired end. In this
sense, all human actors are entrepreneurs.
Austrians tend to focus on this kind of pure entrepreneurship, the entrepreneurial aspect of all
human behavior. In doing so, however, they often overlook a particular case of entrepreneurship,
the driving force behind the structure of production: the capitalist%entrepreneur, who risks his
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money capital in anticipation of future events. Kirzner’s (1973, 1979) influential interpretation of
Mises identifies "alertness" or "discovery," rather than uncertainty bearing, as the defining
property of entrepreneurship. In Kirzner’s framework, entrepreneurial profit is the reward to
superior alertness to profit opportunities. The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who discov-
ers a discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more typical case,
the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production process and steps in to fill this
market gap before others.
Kirzner’s formulation has been criticized, however, for a lack of attention to uncertainty.
According to this criticism, mere alertness to a profit opportunity is not sufficient for earning
profits. To reap financial gain, the entrepreneur must invest resources to realize the discovered
profit opportunity. "Entrepreneurial ideas without money are mere parlor games until the money
is obtained and committed to the projects" (Rothbard, 1985, p. 283). Moreover, excepting the
few cases where buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous (say, electronic trading of
currencies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transactions require some time to complete. The
selling price may fall before the arbitrageur has made his sale, and thus even the pure arbitrageur
faces some probability of loss. In Kirzner’s formulation, the worst that can happen to an entrepre-
neur is the failure to discover an existing profit opportunity. Entrepreneurs either earn profits or
break even, but it is unclear how they suffer losses.
Kirzner (1997, p. 72) argues, more recently, that entrepreneurs can earn losses when they
misread market conditions. "[E]ntrepreneurial boldness and imagination can lead to pure entre-
preneurial losses as well as to pure profit. Mistaken actions by entrepreneurs mean that they have
misread the market, possibly pushing price and output constellations in directions not
equilibrative." But even this formulation makes it clear that it is mistaken actions&not mistaken
discoveries&that leads to loss. Misreading market conditions leads to losses only if the entrepre-
neur has invested resources in a project based on this misreading. It is the failure to anticipate
future market conditions correctly that causes the loss. It seems obscure to describe this as
erroneous discovery, rather than unsuccessful uncertainty bearing.7
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Mises, by contrast, consistently identifies entrepreneurship with both profit and loss. "There
is a simple rule of thumb to tell entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs are
those on whom the incidence of losses on the capital employed falls" (Mises, 1951, p. 112).
Moreover, while Mises indeed acknowledges the element of entrepreneurship in all human
action, it is clear that the potential losses of the capitalist%entrepreneurs are particularly impor-
tant:
Mises applies the concept of the entrepreneur to all cases of uncertainty-bearing,
and since laborers face uncertainty in deciding where to move or what occupation
to go into, laborers are also entrepreneurs. But the most important case of entre-
preneurship, the driving force in shaping the actual structure and patterns of pro-
duction in the market economy, are the capitalist%entrepreneurs, the ones who
commit and risk their capital in deciding when, what, and how much to produce.
The capitalists, too, are far more subject to actual monetary losses than are the
laborers (Rothbard, 1985, p 282).8
Mises is careful to distinguish entrepreneurship from management, the carrying out of those tasks
specified by the capitalist%entrepreneur. "[T]hose who confuse entrepreneurship and manage-
ment close their eyes to the economic problem" (Mises, 1949, p. 708). It is the capital-
ist%entrepreneurs who control the allocation of capital to the various branches of industry.
It is clear from this formulation that the capitalist%entrepreneur must own property. He
cannot invest without prior ownership of financial capital. Menger’s  (1871, pp. 159%61) treat-
ment of production includes as entrepreneurial functions economic calculation, the "act of will,"
and "supervision of the execution of the production plan." These functions "entail property
ownership and, therefore, mark the Mengerian entrepreneur as a capitalist%entrepreneur"
(Salerno, 1998, p. 30). Menger describes "command of the services of capital" as a "necessary
prerequisite" for economic activity. Even in large firms, although he may employ "several
helpers," the entrepreneur himself continues to bear uncertainty, perform economic calculation,
and supervise production, even if these functions "are ultimately confined . . . to determining the
allocation of portions of wealth to particular productive purposes only by general categories, and
10
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to selection and control of persons" (Menger, 1871, pp. 160%61; quoted in Salerno, 1998, p. 30).9
An Austrian theory of the firm, then, is essentially a theory about the ownership and use of
capital. As Yu (1998, p. 7) puts it, "the Austrian firm is a collection of capital resources."
Unfortunately, the Austrian literature on the firm often confuses entrepreneurship with
innovation, strategic planning, leadership, and other functions more properly associated with
management than ownership. Witt (1998a, 1998b), for example, describes entrepreneurship as a
form of "cognitive leadership." Witt (1998b) outlines a potential Austrian theory of the firm by
combining recent literature on cognitive psychology with Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurs require complementary factors of production, he argues, which are coordinated
within the firm. For the firm to be successful, the entrepreneur must establish a tacit, shared
framework of goals&what the management literature terms "leadership." A proper Austrian
theory of the firm, then, must take account of the ways in which entrepreneurs communicate their
business conceptions within the organization.
The problem with this argument is that while organizational leadership is undoubtedly impor-
tant, it is not particularly "entrepreneurial." Entrepreneurship has little necessarily to do with
having a business plan, communicating a "corporate culture," or other dimensions of business
leadership; these are attributes of the successful manager, who may or may not be an entrepre-
neur.10 Moreover, even if top-level managerial skill were the same as entrepreneurship, it is
unclear why "cognitive leadership"&tacit communication of shared modes of thought, core
capabilities, and the like&should be more "entrepreneurial" than other, comparatively mundane
managerial tasks such as structuring incentives, limiting opportunism, administering rewards,
and so on.
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4.2. Economic calculation
All entrepreneurs, particularly capitalist%entrepreneurs, use economic calculation as their
primary decision-making tool. By economic calculation we simply mean the use of present prices
and anticipated future prices to compare present costs with expected future benefits. In this way
the entrepreneur decides what goods and services should be produced, and what methods of
production should be used to produce them. "The business of the entrepreneur is not merely to
experiment with new technological methods, but to select from the multitude of technologically
feasible methods those which are best fit to supply the public in the cheapest way with the things
they are asking for most urgently" (Mises, 1951, p. 110). To make this selection, the entrepreneur
must be able to weigh the costs and expected benefits of various courses of action.
The need for economic calculation places ultimate limits on the size of the organization
(Klein, 1996). Indeed, many writers have recognized the connections between the socialist
calculation debate and the problems of internal organization (Montias, 1976; Williamson, 1991).
Kirzner (1992, p. 162), for example, interprets the costs of internal organization in terms of
Hayek’s knowledge problem: "In a free market, any advantages that may be derived from ‘cen-
tral planning’ . . . are purchased at the price of an enhanced knowledge problem. We may expect
firms to spontaneously expand to the point where additional advantages of ‘central’ planning are
just offset by the incremental knowledge difficulties that stem from dispersed information."
What, precisely, drives this knowledge problem? The mainstream literature on the firm
focuses mostly on the costs of market exchange, and much less on the costs of governing internal
exchange. The new research has yet to produce a fully satisfactory explanation of the limits to
firm size (Williamson, 1985, chapter 6). In Coase’s words, "Why does the entrepreneur not
organize one less transaction or one more?" Or, more generally, "Why is not all production
carried on in one big firm?" (Coase, 1937, pp. 42%43). Existing contractual explanations rely on
problems of authority and responsibility (Arrow, 1974); incentive distortions caused by residual
ownership rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Holmström and Tirole, 1989; Hart and Moore,
1990); and the costs of attempting to reproduce market governance features within the firm (Wil-
liamson, 1985, chapter 6). Rothbard (1962, pp. 544%50) offered an explanation for the firm’s
vertical boundaries based on Mises’s claim that economic calculation under socialism is impossi-
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ble. Rothbard argued that the need for monetary calculation in terms of actual prices not only
explains the failures of central planning under socialism, but places an upper bound on firm size.
Rothbard’s account begins with the recognition that Mises’s position on socialist economic
calculation is not exclusively, or even primarily, about socialism. It is about the role of prices for
capital goods. Entrepreneurs allocate resources based on their expectations about future prices,
and the information contained in present prices. To make profits, they need information about all
prices, not only the prices of consumer goods but the prices of factors of production. Without
markets for capital goods, these goods can have no prices, and hence entrepreneurs cannot make
judgments about the relative scarcities of these factors. In any environment, then&socialist or
not&where a factor of production has no market price, a potential user of that factor will be
unable to make rational decisions about its use. Stated this way, Mises’s claim is simply that
efficient resource allocation in a market economy requires well-functioning asset markets. To
have such markets, factors of production must be privately owned.
Rothbard’s contribution was to generalize Mises’s analysis of this problem under socialism
to the context of vertical integration and the size of the organization. Rothbard writes in Man,
Economy, and State that up to a point, the size of the firm is determined by costs, as in the
textbook model. However, "the ultimate limits are set on the relative size of the firm by the
necessity for markets to exist in every factor, in order to make it possible for the firm to calculate
its profits and losses" (Rothbard, 1962, p. 536). This argument hinges on the notion of "implicit
costs." The market value of opportunity costs for factor services&what Rothbard calls "estimates
of implicit incomes"&can be determined only if there are external markets for those factors (pp.
542%44). For example, if an entrepreneur hires himself to manage the business, the opportunity
cost of his labor must be included in the firm’s costs. Yet without an actual market for the entre-
preneur’s managerial services, he will be unable to figure out his opportunity cost; his balance
sheets will therefore be less accurate than they would if he could measure his opportunity cost.
The same problem affects a firm owning multiple stages of production. A large, integrated
firm is typically organized into semi-autonomous profit centers, each specializing in a particular
final or intermediate product. The central management of the firm uses the implicit incomes of
the business units, as reflected in statements of divisional profit and loss, to allocate physical and
13
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financial capital across the divisions. To compute divisional profits and losses, the firm needs an
economically meaningful transfer price for all internally transferred goods and services. If there
is an external market for the component, the firm can use that market price as the transfer price.
Without a market price, however, the transfer price must be estimated, either on a cost-plus basis
or by bargaining between the buying and selling divisions (Gabor, 1984; Eccles and White,
1988; King, 1994). Such estimated transfer prices contain less information than actual market
prices.
The use of internally traded intermediate goods for which no external market reference is
available thus introduces distortions that reduce organizational efficiency. This gives us the
element missing from contemporary theories of economic organization, an upper bound: the firm
is constrained by the need for external markets for all internally traded goods. In other words, no
firm can become so large that it is both the unique producer and user of an intermediate product;
for then no market-based transfer prices will be available, and the firm will be unable to calculate
divisional profit and loss and therefore unable to allocate resources correctly between divisions.11 
Of course, internal organization does avoid the holdup problem, which the firm would face if
there were a unique outside supplier; conceivably, this benefit could outweigh the increase in
"incalculability" (Rothbard, 1962, p. 548). Usually, however, the costs from the loss of calcula-
tion will likely exceed the costs of external governance.12
Like Kirzner (1992), Rothbard viewed his contribution as consistent with the basic Coasian
framework. In a later elaboration of this argument (Rothbard, 1976, p. 76), he states that his own
treatment of the limits of the firm
14
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serves to extend the notable analysis of Professor Coase on the market determi-
nants of the size of the firm, or the relative extent of corporate planning within the
firm as against the use of exchange and the price mechanism. Coase pointed out
that there are diminishing benefits and increasing costs to each of these two alter-
natives, resulting, as he put it, in an "‘optimum’ amount of planning" in the free
market system. Our thesis adds that the costs of internal corporate planning be-
come prohibitive as soon as markets for capital goods begin to disappear, so that
the free-market optimum will always stop well short not only of One Big Firm
throughout the world market but also of any disappearance of specific markets
and hence of economic calculation in that product or resource (Rothbard, 1976, p.
76).
"Central planning" within the firm, then, is possible only when the firm exists within a larger
market setting.13
Rothbard’s argument about the limits to firm size has several implications for research in
industrial organization and business strategy. First, all else equal, firms able to use market-based
transfer prices should eventually outperform firms using administered or negotiated transfer
prices. Second, innovation should be particularly difficult in industries where few of the relevant
manufacturing capabilities exist in the market (Langlois and Robertson, 1995). Because innovat-
ing firms are more likely to be using unique intermediate goods and production processes,
innovation carries with its benefits the cost of more severe internal distortions. Economic calcu-
lation is then another obstacle the innovator must overcome. Third, the allocation of overhead or
fixed cost across divisions provides will be particularly problematic. If an input is essentially
indivisible (or nonexcludable), then there is no way to compute the opportunity cost of just the
portion of the input used by a particular division (see Rogerson, 1992, for a discussion of these
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 Mises (1944, p. 32) recognized the problem of allocating overhead costs, mentioning this as a possible
exception to the notion that divisional accounting costs can reflect "true" costs.
problems).14 Firms with high overhead costs should thus be at a disadvantage relative to firms
able to allocate costs more precisely between business units. In the literature on cost accounting
there has been some recent interest in "market simulation accounting" (Staubus, 1986), by which
firms try to assess the price at which an asset would trade in an active market, based on observed
market prices and related information. Rothbard’s position on the limits to firm size suggests that
the market simulation approach may prove a useful accounting technique.
5. Capital markets
If the capitalist%entrepreneur is the driving force behind the industrialized, market economy,
then economists should focus their attention on the financial markets, the capital-
ist%entrepreneur’s main venue. Here is where this most important form of entrepreneurship takes
place. Of course, in the traditional, production-function theory of the firm, capital markets do
little but supply financial capital to managers, who can get as much capital as they wish at the
going market price. In a more sophisticated understanding, managers do not decide how much
capital they want;  capitalists decide where capital should be allocated. In doing so, they provide
essential discipline to the plant-level manager, who Mises (1949, p. 304) calls the entrepreneur’s
"junior partner."
When capitalists supply resources to firms, they usually delegate to managers the day-to-day
responsibility for use of those resources. Managers may thus be able to use those resources to
benefit themselves, rather than the capitalist. The problem of managerial discretion&what we
now call the principal%agent problem&occupies much current research in the theory of the firm.
Under what conditions can managers exercise discretionary behavior? What kinds of rules, or
mechanisms, can be designed to align the manager’s interest with the owner’s? Without effective
rules, what actions will managers choose? An early application was the proposed "separation of
ownership and control" in the modern corporation. Berle and Means (1932) argued that the
modern firm is run not by its owners, the shareholders, but by salaried managers, whose interests
are different from those of shareholders and include executive perks, prestige, and similar re-
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wards. If the corporation is diffusely held, no individual shareholder has sufficient motivation to
engage in (costly) monitoring managerial decisions, and therefore discretion will flourish at the
expense of the market value of the firm. However, Berle and Means did not consider how owners
might limit this discretion ex ante, without the need for detailed ex post monitoring.
Agency theory&now the standard language of corporate finance&addresses these problems.
As developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), and
Jensen (1986), agency theory studies the design of ex-ante incentive-compatible mechanisms to
reduce agency costs in the face of potential moral hazard (malfeasance) by agents. Agency costs
are defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) as the sum of "(1) the monitoring expendi-
tures of the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual loss." The
residual loss represents the potential gains from trade that fail to be realized because perfect
incentives for agents cannot be provided when the agent’s actions are unobservable. In a typical
agency model, a principal assigns an agent to do some task (producing output, for instance), but
has only an imperfect signal of the agent’s performance (for example, effort). The agency prob-
lem is analogous to the signal-extraction problem popularized in macroeconomics by Lucas
(1972): how much of the observable outcome is due to the agent’s effort, and how much is due to
factors beyond the agent’s control? The optimal incentive contract balances the principal’s desire
to provide incentives to increase the agent’s effort (for example, by basing compensation on the
outcome) with the agent’s desire to be insured from the fluctuations in compensation that come
from these random factors.
Owners of corporations (shareholders) use a variety of control or governance mechanisms to
limit the managerial discretion described by Berle and Means. Both "internal" and "external"
governance may be employed. Internally, owners may establish a board of directors to oversee
the actions of managers. They can use performance-based compensation to motivate managers to
act in the owners’ interest (for instance, giving managers stock options instead of cash bonuses).
They can adopt a particular organizational form, such as the "M-form" structure, in which mana-
gerial discretion is more easily kept in check (Williamson, 1975). Finally, they can rely on
competition within the firm for top-level management positions&what Fama (1980) calls the
internal market for managers&to limit the discretionary behavior of top-level management. 
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Even more important are external forces that help align managers’ interests with those of
shareholders. Competition in the product market, for example, assures that firms whose manag-
ers engage in too much discretionary behavior will fail, costing the managers their jobs. In
countries where universal banking is permitted, large equity holders such as banks can exercise
considerable influence over managerial behavior. The external governance mechanism that has
received the most attention, however, is the market for ownership itself, the "market for corpo-
rate control."
Henry Manne’s essay, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control" (1965), responded to
Berle and Means by noting that managerial discretion will be limited if there is an active market
for control of corporations. When managers engage in discretionary behavior, the share price of
the firm falls, and this invites takeover and subsequent replacement of incumbent management.
Therefore while managers may hold considerable autonomy over the day-to-day operations of
the firm, the stock market places strict limits on their behavior.
Mises makes the same general point in the passage in Human Action (1949) distinguishing
what Mises calls "profit management" from "bureaucratic management" (pp. 308%11). It is true,
Mises acknowledges, that the salaried managers of a corporation hold considerable autonomy
over the day-to-day operations of the firm. Nonetheless, the shareholders make the ultimate
decisions about allocating resources to the firm, in their decisions to buy and sell stock:
[The Berle%Means] doctrine disregards entirely the role that the capital and
money market, the stock and bond exchange, which a pertinent idiom simply calls
the "market," plays in the direction of corporate business. . . . [T]he changes in the
prices of common and preferred stock and of corporate bonds are the means ap-
plied by the capitalists for the supreme control of the flow of capital. The price
structure as determined by the speculations on the capital and money markets and
on the big commodity exchanges not only decides how much capital is available
for the conduct of each corporation’s business; it creates a state of affairs to which
the managers must adjust their operations in detail (p. 303).
Mises does not identify the takeover mechanism per se as a means for capitalists to exercise
control&takeovers were much less popular before the late 1950s, when the tender offer began to
replace the proxy contest as the acquisition method of choice&but the main point is clear: The
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 Compare Rothbard, 1962, p. 538: "Hired managers may successfully direct production or choose production
processes. But the ultimate responsibility and control of production rests inevitably with the owner, with the
businessman whose property the product is until it is sold. It is the owners who make the decision concerning how
much capital to invest and in what particular processes. And particularly, it is the owners who must choose the
managers. The ultimate decisions concerning the use of their property and the choice of the men to manage it must
therefore be made by the owners and by no one else."
true basis of the market system is not the product market, the labor market, or the managerial
market, but the capital market, where entrepreneurial judgments are exercised and decisions
carried out.15
Mises’s treatment of the importance of financial markets is also the key to his final rebuttal in
Human Action to Lange, Lerner, and the other market-socialist critics of his calculation argument
(Mises, 1949, pp. 698%715). The market socialists, he argued, fail to understand that the main
task performed by a market system is not the pricing of consumer goods, but the allocation of
financial capital among the various branches of industry. By focusing on production and pricing
decisions within a given structure of capital, the socialists ignore the vital role of capital markets.
6. Toward an Austrian theory of corporate governance
Given that financial-market entrepreneurship is the defining feature of a market economy,
that economic calculation is the capitalist%entrepreneur’s primary tool, and that economic calcu-
lation requires well-functioning capital markets, what can capitalist%entrepreneurs do to govern
their relationships with operational managers? What should be the basis of an Austrian theory of
corporate governance? This section suggests four areas that Austrians should address: the con-
cept of the firm as an investment; the relationship between internal and external capital markets;
comparative corporate governance; and financiers as entrepreneurs. Consider each in turn.
6.1. Firms as investments
Because the owner, and not the manager, is the ultimate decision maker, the Austrian theory
of the firm should comprise two elements: a theory of investment (corporate finance), and a
theory of how investors provide incentives for managers to use these resources efficiently (corpo-
rate governance). In microeconomics textbooks, by contrast, the capital investors give to the firm
is treated as just another factor of production. Its price, the "rental price of capital" or interest, is
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simply another cost to the producer. Any excess of revenues over costs, including the cost of
capital, goes to the manager (sometimes confusingly called the "entrepreneur"). This residual is
called "profit," though it is not profit in the Misesian sense. 
In the ownership perspective, as developed by Gabor and Pearce (1952, 1958), Vickers
(1970), Moroney (1972), and others, the firm is viewed as an investment. The firm’s goal is to
maximize the return on invested capital. This money capital may be regarded as a factor of
production, but it is a unique factor, the "controlling" factor that receives the net proceeds of the
operation. Other factors, such as labor (including management) and physical capital, are regarded
as "contracting" factors that receive a fixed payment. The services of the top-level manager are
thus treated as a cost, while the investor is considered the residual claimant. Also note that
because the capitalist bears the risk that the investment will fail, upon investing the capitalist has
become an entrepreneur. Furthermore, to the extent that the entrepreneur (as Kirznerian discov-
erer) hires himself out to the capitalist as a salaried manager, his compensation is not entrepre-
neurial profit; it is a cost to the owner of the firm (Rothbard, 1985, p. 283).
This has significant implications for firm behavior. First, the firm will not always expand
output to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. For if the firm is earning
positive net returns at its current level of output, instead of increasing output until marginal net
returns fall to zero, the firm could simply take those returns and employ them elsewhere, either to
set up a new firm in the same industry or to diversify into a new industry (Gabor and Pearce,
1952, p. 253). The efficient scale of production is determined by outside investment opportuni-
ties, not simply the marginal returns from producing a single output. 
Indeed, it is easy to show that under fairly weak assumptions, the output level that maximizes
the profit rate is less than the output level that maximizes the level of profit. Consider a standard,
concave profit function; add a "money capital requirement," the amount of capital required to
finance a given level of output. As long as the money capital requirement is increasing in output,
the output level that maximizes the profit rate&profit divided by the money capital required to
finance that output level&is less than the output level that maximizes profit. From the capitalist’s
perspective, output should be expanded to the point where the return on the last dollar of money
capital is just equal to the opportunity cost of that last dollar of money capital. But as long as the
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plant manager is not free to invest his financial capital elsewhere, the manager’s cost curves do
not reflect this opportunity cost. Hence the manager chooses a higher output level than that
which maximizes the capitalist’s return.
Significantly, for internal accounting purposes, firms are typically structured such that the
goal of any operating unit is to maximize the return on its invested capital. In fact, not only do
firms set up divisions as profit centers, as discussed above, but groups of profit centers are
frequently grouped together as "investment centers" within the firm itself. Reece and Cool (1978)
studied 620 of the largest U.S. firms in 1978 and  found that 74 percent had investment centers.
These subunits are commonly evaluated according to a return-on-investment (ROI) criterion,
such as the ratio of accounting net income generated by the investment center divided by total
assets invested in the investment center. More recently, measures such as residual income and
"economic value added" (EVA) has become popular as an alternative to ROI (Stern, Stewart, and
Chew, 1995). The point is that individual divisions are being evaluated on the same basis as the
corporation itself&namely, what kind of return is being generated on the financial resources
invested.
Second, the firm-as-investment concept relates closely to an emerging literature on merger as
a form of firm-level investment (Bittlingmayer, 1996; Andrade and Stafford, 1997). Once man-
agers have acquired financial resources from capitalists, these managers have some discretion
over how to invest those resources. To supplement the "normal" forms of firm-level invest-
ment&capital expenditures and R&D&managers may choose to purchase assets of existing firms
through merger. Merger may be a different form of investment; Andrade and Stafford (1997)
find, for example, that mergers in particular industries tend to be clustered over time, while
rankings of non-merger forms of investment by industry tend to remain constant. This suggests
that merger activity is encouraged by specific industry or policy shocks, like deregulation, the
emergence of junk-bond financing, and increased foreign competition (Mitchell and Mulherin,
1996). Nonetheless, mergers will be evaluated by the returns they generate, just like any other
investment.
6.2 Internal capital markets
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 Such a process is described explicitly in the 1977 Annual Report of Fuqua Industries, a diversified firm with
interests in lawn and garden equipment, sports and recreation, entertainment, photofinishing, transportation,
housing, and food and beverages: "Fuqua’s strategy is to allocate resources into business segments having prospects
of the highest return on investment and to extract resources from areas where the future return on investment does
not meet our ongoing requirements. . . . The same principle of expanding areas of high return and shrinking areas of
low return is constantly extended to product lines and markets within individual Fuqua operations. Only with a
diversified business structure is the application of this modern fundamental business investment policy practical."
Another highly diversified firm, Bangor Punta Corporation, explains that the role of its corporate headquarters is "to
act as a central bank supplying operating units with working capital and capital funds" (1966 Annual Report).
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 Myers and Majluf (1984) show that if the information asymmetry between a standalone firm and potential
outside investors is large enough, the firm may forego investments with positive net present value rather than issue
risky securities to finance them.
In his extension of the Coasian framework, Williamson (1975, 1981) describes the modern
multidivisional or "M-form" corporation as a means of intra-firm capital allocation. Capital
markets allocate resources between standalone, single-product firms. In the diversified,
multidivisional firm, by contrast, resources are allocated internally, as the entrepreneur distrib-
utes funds among profit-center divisions. This "internal capital market" replicates the allocative
and disciplinary roles of the financial markets, shifting resources toward more profitable lines of
production.16 Coase claimed that firms "supplant" markets when the transaction costs of market
exchange exceed those of internal production. Williamson adds that diversified, multidivisional
firms "supplant" capital markets when the costs of external finance exceed those of internal
resource allocation. 
According to the internal capital markets theory, diversified firms arise when limits in the
capital market permit internal management to allocate and manage funds more efficiently than
the external capital market. These efficiencies may come from several sources. First, the central
headquarters of the firm (HQ) typically has access to information unavailable to external parties,
which it extracts through its own internal auditing and reporting procedures (Williamson, 1975,
pp. 145%47).17 Second, managers inside the firm may also be more willing to reveal information
to HQ than to outsiders, since revealing the same information to the capital market would also
reveal it to rival firms, potentially hurting the firm’s competitive position. Third, HQ can also
intervene selectively, making marginal changes to divisional operating procedures, whereas the
external market can discipline a division only by raising or lowering the share price of the entire
firm. Fourth, HQ has residual rights of control that providers of outside finance do not have,
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making it easier to redeploy the assets of poorly performing divisions (Gertner, Scharfstein, and
Stein, 1994). More generally, these control rights allow HQ to add value by engaging in "winner
picking" among competing projects when credit to the firm as a whole is constrained (Stein,
1997). Fifth, the internal capital market may react more "rationally" to new information: those
who dispense the funds need only take into account their own expectations about the returns to a
particular investment, and not their expectations about other investors’ expectations. Hence there
would be no speculative bubbles or waves.
Bhide (1990) uses the internal capital markets framework to explain both the conglomerate
merger wave of the 1960s and the divestitures of the 1980s, regarding these developments as
responses to changes in the relative efficiencies of internal and external finance. For instance,
corporate refocusing can be explained as a consequence of the rise of takeover by tender offer
rather than proxy contest, the emergence of new financial techniques and instruments like lever-
aged buyouts and high-yield bonds, and the appearance of takeover and breakup specialists like
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts which themselves performed many functions of the conglomerate HQ
(Williamson, 1992). Furthermore, the emergence of the conglomerate in the 1960s can itself be
traced to the emergence of the M-form corporation. Because the multidivisional structure treats
business units as semi-independent profit or investment centers, it is much easier for an M-form
corporation to expand via acquisition than it is for the older unitary structure. New acquisitions
can be integrated smoothly when they can preserve much of their internal structure and retain
control over day-to-day operations. In this sense, the conglomerate could emerge only after the
multidivisional structure had been diffused widely throughout the corporate sector.
Internal capital market advantages, then, explain why diversification can increase the value of
the firm. During the 1960s, entrepreneurs took advantage of financial market imperfections
(many due to regulatory interference) to form large, highly diversified firms (Hubbard and Palia,
1998; Klein, 1998b). They also benefitted from government spending in high-technology and
other defense-related businesses, which were particularly suited for acquisition. In the two
subsequent decades, financial-market performance improved, reducing the internal capital market
advantages of conglomerate firms.
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 For more on the relationship between Thornton and McNamara, see Shapley, 1993, and Byrne, 1993.
If entrepreneurs have a special ability to manage information and allocate financial resources
within the firm&if diversified firms "supplant" external capital markets&then why are capital
markets necessary at all? Why not, to paraphrase Coase’s (1937, pp. 42%43) second question,
organize the entire economy as one giant conglomerate? The answer is that the argument for
internal capital market advantages does not "scale up"; it applies only to firms that are them-
selves engaged in rivalrous competition. This situation, in turn, implies strict limits to firm size,
even for large conglomerates.
The argument for the efficiency of internal capital markets is that compared with outside
investors, the entrepreneur can extract additional information about divisional requirements and
performance. It is not that the entrepreneur’s knowledge substitutes for the knowledge embodied
in market prices. To evaluate the merit of a proposed investment, the central management of a
diversified conglomerate still relies on market prices to calculate expected (money) benefits and
cost. Internal accounting does not substitute for money prices; it merely uses the information
contained in prices in a particular way. When capital-goods prices are distorted&for example,
because of financial market regulation&then the entrepreneur’s additional knowledge is that
much more valuable. So under those conditions we would expect an increase in M-form corpora-
tions, allocating resources via internal capital markets. During the 1960s that is exactly what we
observed.
Correctly understood, the internal capital markets hypothesis does not state that internal
capital markets supplant financial markets. It states that internal capital markets supplement
financial markets. Even ITT’s Harold Geneen, LTV’s James Ling, Litton’s "Tex" Thornton, and
the other conglomerators of the 1960s were constrained by the need for economic calculation in
terms of money prices. Thornton’s "Whiz Kids" have been criticized for their advocacy of
"scientific management" or "management by the numbers." Yet Thornton’s techniques were
quite successful at Litton. It was only when his disciple Robert McNamara tried to apply the
same techniques to a nonmarket setting&the Vietnam War&that the limitations of "scientific
management" were revealed.18
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 Chapter 1 of Bureaucracy, on profit management and the sources of entrepreneurial profit, contains a remark-
ably lucid account of economic calculation under capitalism and its impossibility under socialism. "To the entrepre-
neur of capitalist society a factor of production through its price sends out a warning: Don’t touch me, I am ear-
marked for another, more urgent need. But under socialism these factors of production are mute" (Mises, 1944, p.
29). 
Mises also provides a very Coase-like discussion of the make-or-buy decision, though without citation (p. 33).
6.3 Comparative corporate governance
How well do various systems of corporate governance function? The last few years have seen
the growth of a new literature on "comparative corporate governance," the study of alternative
means of governing relations between firm owners and managers. The typical comparison is
between stock-market systems like those in the U.S. and U.K., and bank-centered systems like
those in Germany and Japan (Roe, 1994, 1997; Gilson and Black, 1997; Milhaupt, 1997). Ac-
cording to Roe, the phenomenon he calls "strong managers, weak owners" is an outgrowth not of
the market process, but of legal restrictions on firm ownership and control. In the U.S., for
example, banks and other institutions are forbidden from owning firms; antitrust laws prohibit
industrial combinations like the Japanese keiretsu; and antitakeover restrictions dilute the effects
of the takeover mechanism. Laws that require diffuse ownership create what Roe terms the
"Berle%Means corporation," in which "fragmented ownership shifts power in the firm to manag-
ers" (p. 93). 
Mises makes a very similar argument in Human Action. There he notes that "the emergence
of an omnipotent managerial class is not a phenomenon of the unhampered market economy,"
but a result of government policy (Mises, 1949, p. 307). Here he expands upon his earlier analy-
sis in Bureaucracy (1944, p. 12), where he attacks the claim that bureaucracy follows naturally
from firm size. Mises conceives of bureaucracy as rule-following, as opposed to profit-seeking,
behavior. He reserves the term "bureaucratic management" for the governing of activities that
have no cash value on the market. As long as a firm’s inputs and outputs are bought and sold, the
central management of the firm will have the information provided by market prices to evaluate
the efficiency of the various branches and divisions within the firm. Then subordinate managers
can be given wide discretion to make daily operational decisions, without the pursuit of profit.19
If an organization produces a good or service that has no market price&the output of a govern-
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 For overviews of this literature see Romano, 1992, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, and Zingales, 1997.
ment agency, for example&then subordinate managers must be given specific instructions for
how to perform their tasks. 
The fact that managers in a private firm have latitude to make day-to-day decisions, Mises
argues, does not make the firm "bureaucratic." "[N]o profit-seeking enterprise, no matter how
large, is liable to become bureaucratic provided the hands of its management are not tied by gov-
ernment interference. The trend toward bureaucratic rigidity is not inherent in the evolution of
business. It is an outcome of government meddling with business" (Mises, 1944, p. 12). By this
Mises means that government interference impedes the entrepreneur’s use of economic calcula-
tion and the attempt to use prices to impose managerial discipline. Mises gives three examples
(pp. 64%73): taxes and price regulations that interfere with corporate profits (distorting an impor-
tant signal of managerial performance); laws that interfere with hiring and promotion (including
the need to hire public relations staffs and legal and accounting personnel to comply with gov-
ernment reporting requirements); and the omnipresent threat of arbitrary antitrust or regulatory
activity, in response to which entrepreneurs must become adept at "diplomacy and bribery"
(p. 72). The effects of legal restrictions on corporate governance an organizational form is an
important and growing area, and further research from an Austrian perspective is sorely needed.
6.4 Financiers as entrepreneurs
As discussed above, the market for corporate control places strict limits on the ability of
managers to pursue their own goals rather than those of the capitalist%entrepreneurs. However, in
the mainstream literature at least, there is much debate on the effectiveness of the takeover
mechanism in providing managerial discipline.20 If managers desire acquisitions to increase their
own prestige or span of control&to engage in "empire building"&then an unregulated market will
generate too many takeovers. Indeed, several studies have found a sharp divergence between
market participants’ pre-merger expectations about the post-merger performance of merging
firms, and the firms’ actual performance rates. Ravenscraft and Scherer’s (1987) large-scale
study of manufacturing firms, for example, found that while the share prices of merging firms
did on average rise with the announcement of the proposed restructuring, post-merger profit rates
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were unimpressive. They find that nearly one-third of all acquisitions during the 1960s and 1970s
were eventually divested. Ravenscraft and Scherer conclude that mergers typically promote
empire building rather than efficiency, and they support increased restrictions on takeover activ-
ity. Jensen (1986, 1993) suggests changes in the tax code to favor dividends and share repur-
chases over direct reinvestment, thus limiting managers’ ability to channel free cash flow into
unproductive acquisitions.
However, the fact that some mergers&indeed, many mergers, takeovers, and reorganiza-
tions&turn out to be unprofitable, does not imply market failure or necessarily prescribe any
policy response. Errors will always be made in a world of uncertainty. Even the financial mar-
kets, which aggregate the collective wisdom of the capitalist%entrepreneurs, will sometimes
make the wrong judgment on a particular business transaction. Sometimes the market will re-
ward, ex ante, a proposed restructuring that has no efficiency rationale. But this is due not to
capital market failure, but to imperfect knowledge. Final judgments about success and failure can
be made only ex post, as the market process plays itself out. Moreover, there is no reason to
believe that courts or regulatory authorities can make better judgments than the financial mar-
kets. The decisions of courts and government agencies will in fact tend to be far worse: unlike
market participants, judges and bureaucrats pursue a variety of private agendas, unrelated to
economic efficiency. Furthermore, the market is quick to penalize error as it is discovered; no
hearings, committees, or fact-finding commissions are required. In short, that firms often fail is
surprising only to those committed to textbook models of competition in which the very notion
of "failure" is defined away. 
Another criticism of the market for corporate control is that unregulated financial markets
engage in too few takeovers, due to a free-rider problem associated with tender offers (see, for
example, Scharfstein, 1988). Critics point out that if the difference between the current (under-
valued) price of the firm and its after-takeover market value is common knowledge, then the
target firm’s shareholders will refuse to tender their shares until the current price is bid up,
appropriating a share of the returns to the acquiring firm. These critics conclude that regulation,
not the takeover market, should be used to discipline managers.
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The flaw in this argument is that it assumes perfect knowledge on the part of investors. The
typical shareholder will not usually have the same information as incumbent managers, outside
"raiders," and other specialists. It is not in the small shareholder’s interest to learn these details;
that is why he delegates such responsibilities to the managers in the first place. As Hayek (1945)
described it, there is a "division of knowledge" in society. The raider who discovers a difference
between a firm’s current market value and its potential value under new management has an
opportunity for an entrepreneurial profit (less the transaction costs of takeover). Because share-
holders have delegated these responsibilities, they will not usually earn a share of this profit.
Nonetheless, as Rothbard (1962, p. 372) observes, because shareholders (owners) choose to
delegate operational responsibility to managers&contracting out for the managerial func-
tion&they themselves retain the ultimate rights of control.
Moreover, the post-takeover market value of the firm is uncertain; the raider’s profit, if he is
successful, is the reward for bearing this uncertainty. In this sense the takeover artist is a
Misesian capitalist%entrepreneur. This account, however, could use further elaboration. For
example, how is the bearing of uncertainty distributed among participants in various forms of
restructuring? How do regulatory barriers hamper the capitalist%entrepreneur’s ability to exercise
the entrepreneurial function in this context?
7. Conclusions
The main message of this paper is that Austrians can continue to work within the contractual,
or Coasian, approach to the firm in elaborating the insights discussed above. In particular, the
problem of corporate governance, and the corollary view that firms are investments, belongs at
the forefront of Austrian research on the theory of the firm. Emphasis should thus be placed on
the plans and actions of the capitalist%entrepreneur.
A particularly undeveloped area concerns the provision of capital to small, "entrepreneurial"
ventures. Most of the literature on governance focuses on the large corporation, and the use of
stock and bond markets to govern these organizations. Equally important, however, are smaller,
privately held firms, financed with venture capital or other forms of investment. So far, the firm-
as-investment literature has said little about these organizations, despite their growing impor-
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tance, particularly in high-growth, technologically advanced industries like software and biotech-
nology. Further research in this area is sorely needed.
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